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I
N THE WAKE OF EGREGIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES, the
international community is under increasing pressure to shift
from a culture of impunity to true accountability, endorsing prin-
ciples of impartial justice and advancing international law. In the
early 1990s, some 50 years after the judgments at Nuremberg, the
United Nations Security Council created the International Criminal
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) to prosecute atrocities that took
place in those countries. In 2002 the international community estab-
lished a permanent International Criminal Court (ICC) to try individ-
uals accused of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. The
past few years have also seen the formation of hybrid courts to prose-
cute war crimes in Sierra Leone, East Timor, Cambodia, and Iraq. 
Defense attorneys play an essential role within such tribunals.
Among the most important principles of justice is the right to a
fair trial, based on the notion that all individuals have a right to a
proper defense. A fair and impartial trial is also vital to the credi-
bility and integrity of a court in the eyes of the international com-
munity, the media, and the public. Yet due to the rapid develop-
ment of international criminal law over the past decade and the
emphasis on ending impunity, the international community has
too often overlooked the right to a fair trail as protected by an ade-
quate defense. Numerous inequalities exist between the
Prosecution and Defense in every functioning international crimi-
nal court. Defense attorneys have significantly fewer resources than
prosecutors and little, if any, institutional support. These funda-
mental inequalities threaten the legitimacy and credibility of the
international criminal justice system. 
This lack of equality is particularly evident at the ICTY.
Although the ICTY provides statutory equality, Defense Counsel
are in practice at a significant disadvantage, and this fundamen-
tally affects the fairness of proceedings. The Association of
Defense Counsel for the ICTY (ADC-ICTY), established in
2002, has secured hard-won advancements for Defense Counsel
in the past few years; however, they continue to lack any real insti-
tutional support within the Tribunal. More than 10 years after its
establishment, Defense Counsel still struggle with numerous
aspects of the Tribunal, including its budget, translation services,
and disclosure practices. 
THE HURDLES FACED BY DEFENSE COUNSEL AT THE ICTY
ARTICLE 20(1): The Trial Chambers shall ensure that a
trial is fair and expeditious and that proceedings are con-
ducted in accordance with the rules of procedure and evi-
dence, with full respect for the rights of the accused and due
regard for the protection of victims and witnesses.
ARTICLE 21(1): All persons shall be equal before the
International Tribunal.1
In theory, the Prosecution and Defense at the ICTY have an
equal opportunity to make their best arguments. In practice, howev-
er, this is not the case. Like all international court structures, the
ICTY suffers from a prosecutorial bias. This bias exists for several rea-
sons: (1) the purpose of the court is to prosecute war criminals and
end impunity; (2) many of the judges have backgrounds in human
rights and are accustomed to advocating for victims rather than
alleged perpetrators; and (3) the investigators for the Prosecution are
part of an independent branch of the Tribunal and therefore state
officials are obligated to cooperate and facilitate their investigations.
The prosecutorial bias of the ICTY manifests itself in myriad ways,
from requirements during the early days of the Tribunal that chaper-
ones accompany Defense Counsel staff while using library facilities
(though no similar requirement existed for the Prosecution)2 to a pro-
hibition of Defense Counsel’s use of the Tribunal cafeteria.3 The most
important biases against Defense Counsel at the ICTY, however, lie
in the very structure of the Tribunal and in the lack of resources made
available to Defense Counsel.
STRUCTURAL BIASES
The ICTY has three formal organs: the Chambers, the Office
of the Prosecutor, and the Registry. Although the ICTY has an
organ devoted exclusively to the Prosecution, Defense Counsel is
subsumed within the overburdened Registry, which is also respon-
sible for administration and judicial support services. Within the
Registry, the Office of Legal Aid and Detention Matters (OLAD)
oversees defense issues. The Registry acts as the liaison between
Defense Counsel and the Tribunal and directs court management,
public relations, victim and witness support, detention issues, lan-
guage services, and financing. Defense Counsel feels that the
Registry is unable to adequately support the Defense because of its
other obligations.
A conflict of interest became apparent in 1997 when the
Registry attempted to reduce costs by restricting the maximum
number of hours per month Defense Counsel could bill for fees
and greatly limiting the number of investigators and consultants
they could hire.4 Lacking the status of an independent organ,
Defense Counsel at that time had no structured defense associa-
tion to lobby against such changes. 
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ASSOCIATION OF DEFENSE COUNSEL AT THE ICTY
In September 2002, almost a decade after the establishment of
the ICTY, Tribunal judges called for the creation of an association
that could help ensure high-quality defense and make collective
representations to the organs of the Tribunal on behalf of Defense
Counsel. As a result, the judges modified the Rules of Procedure
and Evidence. The adoption of Rule 44(A)(iii) required that every
defense attorney be a member of an officially recognized association
of counsel to be placed on the so-called Rule 45 List, which is the
list of attorneys approved to practice at the Tribunal.5
To that end, Defense Counsel at the ICTY founded the non-
profit and independent Association of Defense Counsel (ADC-
ICTY). Created under the laws of the Netherlands, the ADC-ICTY
is not an official organ of the ICTY, but nonetheless supports the
function, efficiency, and independence of Defense Counsel practic-
ing at the ICTY. The ICTY officially recognizes the ADC-ICTY as
the Defense Counsel organization serving the Tribunal. 
The objectives of the ADC-ICTY are to support the work
and efficiency of the Defense Counsel, encourage it to participate
in Tribunal activities, advise the Tribunal regarding procedural
changes, and oversee the Defense Counsel’s performance. The
ADC-ICTY works with the various organs of the ICTY to ensure
that legal principles — particularly the need for a fair trial — are
not compromised in an effort to meet the agreed-upon completion
strategy.6 It aims at developing training programs to ensure profes-
sional integrity and oversees disciplinary conduct of Defense
Counsel. Problems that still face Defense Counsel include the need
for better funding, better facilities and resources, improved access
to witnesses, improved translation services, and access to court
databases. The ADC-ICTY has taken a leadership role in address-
ing both the interests of Defense Counsel and the rights of the
accused they represent.
In the past year the ADC-ICTY helped to secure limited
access to the Tribunal’s judicial database for Defense Counsel, an
invaluable tool that allows attorneys to access Tribunal case law.
Nonetheless, truly significant access to the database remains a
problem because Defense Counsel must travel to The Hague to use
the service, which takes away from the limited amount of travel
days allotted to them by the Registry.7 Moreover, unlike the
Chambers, Prosecution, and Registry, Defense Counsel do not
have access to confidential filings available on the judicial database,
even when they have acquired permission from the Court to access
this material. Recently, the ADC-ICTY worked to allow Defense
Counsel access to the Tribunal’s software. Already in use by the
Prosecution, this software facilitates the completion of everyday
tasks. Although staff members from the Chambers, the
Prosecution, and the Registry have received instruction on using
the software, Defense Counsel are still struggling to train person-
nel for these programs. 
A goal of the ADC-ICTY is to establish a Defense Legal
Resource Center (Center) for the ICTY. The Center would make
legal summaries, a defense motion bank, and analysis of the
jurisprudence of the ICTY available to all Defense Counsel prac-
ticing before the Tribunal; provide research papers on general
issues in international humanitarian law, international criminal
procedure, and relevant national criminal law; offer an expert wit-
ness database; and provide a classified catalogue of useful text-
books, case materials, and articles. By improving the effectiveness
of Defense Counsel, the Center would contribute to the Tribunal’s
completion strategy by minimizing delays.8 With the support of
the Tribunal, the ADC-ICTY is currently attempting to secure
funding for such a Center.9 Even with the creation of the ADC-
ICTY, however, Defense Counsel still faces a formidable challenge
in the unjust allotment of resources.
DISPROPORTIONATE BUDGETS
The ADC-ICTY believes that the budget for Defense
Counsel and the Prosecution should be comparable with regard to
trial activities.10 The budget of the ICTY has been and will remain
strained. In 1994 the budget for the Tribunal was $10,800,000.11
By the 2004-05 term the budget had grown to $271,854,600.12
Defense Counsel, whose budget is allocated through the Registry,
receives only 12 percent of the entire budget, while the Prosecution
receives 50 percent.13 In theory the disparity initially existed
because the Prosecution bears the burden of proof and because its
budget includes all investigative work performed by the
Investigative Division. The ADC-ICTY points out, however, that
investigations have now formally ended, meaning that there is lit-
tle need for a full investigation budget.14
But while the Prosecution continues to request and receive
additional funds for investigative purposes, the UN General
Assembly encourages the Registry to cut the budget for Defense
Counsel. The ADC-ICTY submits that further cuts to the defense
budget are neither reasonable nor viable, thus jeopardizing the
Defense Counsel’s ability to provide quality representation and the
fairness of the proceedings.
Additionally, over the past year Defense Counsel at the ICTY
lost approximately 30 percent of their funds because of the U.S.
Dollar to Euro exchange rate.15 Whereas all other organs of the
Tribunal have received adjustments, there has been no similar
adjustment made for Defense Counsel for the loss of these funds.
Currently, the ADC-ICTY is working with the Registry to remedy
this disparity.
INADEQUATE TRANSLATION SERVICES
Article 21 of the ICTY Statute stipulates that the Tribunal
must inform a defendant of the nature and cause of a charge
promptly and in detail in the defendant’s native language; provide
the defendant access to counsel and adequate time and facilities for
the preparation of a defense; allow the defendant equal opportuni-
ICTY Prosecutor Carla Del Ponte with NATO Secretary General Jaap de
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ty to examine witnesses; and provide the defendant the free assis-
tance of an interpreter if the defendant cannot understand or speak
the language used in the Tribunal.16
It is difficult to provide qualified attorneys or assistants that
understand the languages of ICTY defendants. For this reason, the
Tribunal’s newly revised translation policy raises serious concerns.
Translations are not fully covered by the Tribunal’s Translation
Service (CLSS). The ICTY fails to cover, for example, the costs of
a number of services, including translations of inter-team commu-
nications, as well as written and spoken communication between
an attorney and a client. Further, legal aids funds are not intended
to cover these costs and the monthly allocations available to
Defense Counsel are insufficient. 
In addition, CLSS often fails to meet time-sensitive deadlines
for the translation of evidence. In urgent cases, defense attorneys
must cover the costs themselves and apply for reimbursement on a
case-by-case basis. Such requests are not always approved, meaning
Defense Counsel bears the costs. Another problem is paying for
duplicate translations. Often, the Prosecution translates docu-
ments for its own purposes but only discloses the un-translated
version to Defense Counsel, which must have the documents
translated again. 
DELAYED DISCLOSURE
Late disclosure on the part of the Prosecution is a major prob-
lem for Defense Counsel at the ICTY, particularly when documents
need to be translated. Often the most compelling evidence is not
made available until just weeks before the trial begins, even though
suspects are sometimes held in pre-trial detention for 2-3 years.
Although this disparity does not violate the procedural rules of the
ICTY, it puts great pressure on Defense Counsel, particularly
because there are so many cases before the Tribunal. 
Problems also arise when the Prosecution discloses docu-
ments using the Electronic Disclosure System, a computer system
accessible by both the Prosecution and the Defense. When the
Prosecution, for whatever reason, fails to inform Defense Counsel
of where a document is located in the system, the lack of software
training mentioned above places Defense Counsel at a disadvan-
tage. Unable to quickly obtain the needed documents, they have
difficultly adequately preparing for trial. 
A proposed rule change may require Defense Counsel to dis-
close exhibits and witness statements well before the close of the
Prosecution’s case, thereby increasing the Prosecution’s advantage
by permitting it, in effect, to begin rebuttal during the initial pres-
entation of evidence. The ADC-ICTY argues that any disclosure
before the issuance of the Judgment on the Motion for Acquittal
would violate the rights of the accused as provided for under
Article 21, which provides for the right to a fair hearing.17
ADDITIONAL ISSUES
Further problems exist. ICTY regulations require Defense
Counsel to collect fees from the defendant when the Registrar
decides the client can contribute financially to his case. This cre-
ates an inherent tension between counsel and the accused, endan-
gering the integrity of the proceedings. The Tribunal also excludes
Defense Counsel from the working group on the scheduling of
cases, which makes it difficult for them to appropriately allocate
their funding and develop work plans. In contrast, the Prosecution
participates in this working group, making it easier to develop suc-
cessful work plans. Additional problems include the lack of access
to daily court transcripts,18 the inability to participate in joint press
briefings and exclusion from the weekly press briefing notes, the
lack of electronic and face-to-face communication with clients,
and inadequate travel expenses to and from The Hague. This list is
by no means exhaustive.
Many of the problems facing Defense Counsel at the ICTY
can be traced back to the lack of a fully supported defense struc-
ture that has its own organ within the Tribunal. In May 2005 the
then-President of the ADC-ICTY withdrew from its Executive
Committee out of frustration with the Tribunal’s lack of progress
over the past two years. 
LOOKING AHEAD: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT AND THE IRAQI SPECIAL TRIBUNAL
RECENTLY THE ICTY APPEARS TO HAVE ACKNOWLEDGED some of
Defense Counsel’s concerns. The ADC-ICTY continues to develop
a productive relationship with the Registry. Legal aid talks contin-
ue between the Registry and the ADC-ICTY, and a new translation
policy is being fleshed out. A Defense IT Network, established in
June 2005, allows Defense Counsel to access the jurisprudence of
the Tribunal from outside The Hague, safely store materials, and
receive official filings in electronic form. The Tribunal also recently
gave Defense Counsel better, larger facilities outside the Tribunal
building. For more than 10 years, the Defense had shared two
rooms at the ICTY that were too small to accommodate the various
teams. Although these steps are important, they would have been
far more useful at an earlier stage. Further, the ICTY has already set
a bad precedent for future international criminal tribunals, such as
the ICC and the Iraqi Special Tribunal (IST) appear to have adopt-
ed similar structural and practical biases.
Like the ICTY, the ICC has three permanent, independent
structural components, but no equivalent defense structure. Rule
20 of the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, however, requires
the Registry to conduct its operations “in a manner that promotes
the rights of the defense, consistent with the principle of fair trial
as defined in the [ICC] Statute.”19 This includes the protection of
confidentiality, support of defense investigators, access to informa-
tion, and advice to the Prosecution and judges on defense-related
issues. Most importantly, Rule 20 requires the Registry to “ensure
the professional independence of defense counsel.”20 During the
development of the first budget for the ICC, delegates established
a Defense Counsel Unit as part of the Registry. Similar to the
ICTY Office of Legal Aid and Detention Matters, the Defense
Counsel Unit deals with legal aid, legal matters, and general assis-
tance to defense attorneys. 
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ENDNOTES: McGonigle
Members of the ICC seem to agree that procedural protec-
tions must be in place to ensure a fair trial for the Defense. To
this end the ICC modified Rule 140 of its Rules of Procedure
and Evidence to allow the full right of Defense Counsel to exam-
ine witnesses. But the ICTY experience shows that procedural
guarantees do not always translate into institutional practice.
Instead, the real test for the new court will be whether it guaran-
tees fair trials for the accused by ensuring equal resources and
support for the Defense.
Concerns also surround the treatment of defendants and
counsel at the IST. Spokesperson for the Iraqi Prime Minister Laith
Kuba announced in June 2005, “the judges are confident that
Saddam and his co-defendants from the ousted regime will be con-
victed of all the 12 charges” (emphasis added).21 For obvious rea-
sons legal experts have raised serious concerns about what they
view as a rush to judgment. In addition, some have expressed fear
that the trials could become highly politicized, undermining their
credibility. Despite assurances by the Iraqi Government that the
IST will meet international standards, Saddam Hussein’s defense
team has continuously complained about not having sufficient
access to their client or time to prepare an adequate defense. 
CONCLUSION
THE OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR for the ICTY receives more
support, training, and resources than Defense Counsel at the ICTY.
To ensure the legitimacy and integrity of the international criminal
court systems, Defense Counsel and Prosecutors should have an
“equality of arms.” Defense teams must have adequate facilities,
security, access to witnesses, and research support. Defense teams
need to be reasonably funded and organized. Although advance-
ments have been made in recent years, a wide gap remains. 
Even if many legal scholars believe the “institutional bias
towards the prosecution that defense have reported at internation-
al prosecutions from Nuremberg to the ICTY and ICTR” will
remain,22 a well-funded and equally advantaged defense will allevi-
ate many of the existing inequalities. As Judge Hunt stated in the
Milosevic case, “This Tribunal will not be judged by the number of
convictions which it enters, or by the speed with which it con-
cludes the Completion Strategy which the Security Council has
endorsed, but by the fairness of its trials.”23
Until defense structures for international courts are given
independence, adequate funding, and access to research support,
the principle of equal “justice for all” will remain only rhetoric
within the international justice system. Prosecuting individuals for
serious international crimes when there are a large number of vic-
tims is complex and expensive. Defending an individual against
such charges is just as daunting. To ensure fairness, international
defense structures need institutional support and recognition to
solve these systemic problems.
The practices of the ICTY have a significant effect on the
practices at the newly formed ICC. Ambivalence toward defense
issues during the negotiations of the Rome Statute resulted in lit-
tle discussion on the rights of the Defense. Although the ICC pro-
vides statutory guarantees for Defense Counsel and the accused,
defense attorneys are concerned that, like the ICTY, the practices
of the ICC will place defense teams at a significant disadvantage.
There are similar concerns surrounding the national trials at the
IST. Without institutional support for a functioning and inde-
pendent defense within international courts, the legitimacy of the
international criminal justice system will erode. HRB 
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